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ABSTRACT
Internet  worms  spread  in  an  automated  fashion  and  can  cause  tremendous  damage  in  a  short  period.  As  worms  start
spreading, knowing the worm prevalence patterns under the impact of various patching schemes is important for software
vendors to decide whether or not, and when to release the patches. Due to the strong analogy between the spread of worms on
Internet and the spread of disease among human society, we analytically model the spreading process and the impact of
patching decisions on it by using the same techniques in epidemiological research. We find that, only by releasing patches
providing immunity to susceptible users, the epidemic can be ceased efficiently. From the viewpoint of software vendors, the
patch development cost and the reputation cost incurred indirectly from victim users should be balanced to decide whether,
and when, the patch should be released. The paper gives closed form solutions for the optimal patch release time and
discusses the conditions in which the patch should not be released. The results in this paper can be used either as a starting
point for further research, or by software vendors for deciding their patch release strategies.
Keywords
Security strategy, Internet worm, Epidemiological model, Patch.
INTRODUCTION
As Internet becomes more and more pervasive, worms pose an ever-bigger threat to the computer society. Different from
viruses, which usually attach themselves to other files or programs, worms exist as separate entities. They spread themselves
actively over the network from one computer to the next by taking advantage of automatic file sharing and network services,
which makes them difficult to be identified and removed. In 2003, for instants, MSBlast exploited a flaw with the Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) process, and quickly spread out over Internet. Variants of the worm caused computer networks around
the world to collapse. A particularly vicious version of the worm unleashed in August 2003 infected more than 48,000
computers running Microsoft Windows systems in a short period (Shukovsky 2005). In addition to the tremendous loss
among end users, it also caused a huge reputation cost on the system vendor side ¾ a 768 million dollars drop in Microsoft’s
sales to large corporation (INQUIRER 2003), which is partly attributed to the outbreak of the worm. Due to the active
spreading nature, the defense strategies against worms are not quite the same as against computer virus. In addition to release
corrective patches that remove worms and fix infected systems, software vendors usually offer preventive patches to repair
the system flaw and provide immunity to those who have not yet been attacked. For example, Microsoft periodically offers
system patches to Windows system user for protecting them from being exploited by certain worms. However, considering
the fact that there are more than twelve thousand worms out on the Internet (Sophos 2005), it is important to know the worm
prevalence patterns under the impact of various patching schemes before software vendors deciding whether or not, and when
to release the patches. Furthermore, the expected damage caused by certain worm and the reputation cost incurred indirectly
from victim users should be evaluated against the development cost in order to find the optimal patch release time such that
the vendor’s total cost is minimized.
Despite the difference in definition and existence status, Internet worms and computer viruses share many similarities in
terms of random spreading characteristics. Due to the strong analogy between the propagation of computer virus and
biological virus, epidemiology models are widely used in modeling the prevalence of virus and worms in network
environment (Cohen 1987, Murray 1988). Kephart and White (1991, 1993) studied the spread of computer virus with a
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model, where a computer can be infected and cured repeatedly, while Wang (2000),
Zou (2002), and Kim (2004) further enriched the virus propagation literature with a Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR)
model, which assumes a node cannot be infected again once the virus or worm is removed. Both models are widely adopted
and perform well in predicting the virus or worm prevalence in reality. For instants, SIS model fits the scenarios that, the
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victims manually remove the worm without effectively applying preventive patches. Therefore the system is still susceptible
to the same worm. However, in case that appropriate patches are used, the users will not only get rid of the worm, but also be
immune from getting infected again, therefore SIR model applies.
To the best of our knowledge, however, little of previous research addresses the situation that susceptible nodes actively
download and apply preventive patches before the worms even hit them. This is especially true when the worms spread
aggressively  and  the  potential  damage  is  huge.  For  instants,  as  MSBlast  worm  blasted  across  the  web  in  2003,  alert  was
raised via Internet, newspapers, and TV news to urge all computer users download and install the patches from Microsoft’s
web site (BBC News 2003). As a result, the preventive patches prevent both infectious and susceptible from getting infected
in future. Obviously the virus spreading speed is directly linked with the time by which the patches are released and the rate
at which users adopt the preventive patches.
Another issue particularly interesting to software vendors is that, given that a worm’s spreading pattern and potential damage
are  discovered,  whether  or  not  worth  to  develop a  patch  for  it;  and  if  yes,  how soon the  patch  should  be  released.  Faster
development and release can reduce or cease the epidemic earlier, but will cost more on the vendor side in development. On
the other hand, later patch release eases the development but leaves larger window for the worm to spread out. Although, in
many cases, the damage on user side does not impose direct cost to vendors, it usually incurs certain reputation cost, which
may undercut the vendors’ revenue in future. This timing issue of patch release has not been extensively studied. Arora et al.
(2004) study the optimal policy for software vulnerability disclosure under a game-theoretic framework. Cavusoglu et al.
(2004) analyze the tradeoff between patch development duration and potential damage caused by hackers or virus. Their
studies do not particularly consider the worm spreading process over Internet, and the curing process is assumed to be
instantly done after the patch is released. However, due to the random spreading feature, it usually takes a relatively long time
to cease the epidemic even when the patch is available.
In the rest of this paper, we model the spreading process of worms under different circumstance in following section, where
four types of patches, namely, no patch, corrective patch, preventive patch, and comprehensive patch, and their impact on the
worm propagation process, are studied. We show that comprehensive patch has obvious superiority over others in terms of
maximum infection level and duration of epidemic. In section 3, we particularly address the optimal patch release problem
for comprehensively patching scheme, and derive closed form solutions such that the vendor’s total cost is minimized. We
also discuss the conditions under which the patch is immediately released, and the patch is never released. The impact of
different parameters on the optimal patch release time is studied at the same time. Finally we conclude the paper in section 4
and discuss future directions.
THE WORM SPREADING MODEL
Here we assume only one kind of worm is under consideration. Following the same setup as in Kephart (1991), the worm
spreads in a random graph that has totally N nodes, which are assumed to be vulnerable to the worm. The edges represent the
links between computers along which the worm spreads. An infectious node, a node that has been exploited by the worm,
infects its vulnerable neighbors with a rate of b. In following subsections, we first revisit the classic SIS model, also the
simplest case, where no official patch is available. Then we move on to the cases where various types of patches, namely,
corrective patch, preventive patch, and comprehensive patch, are available. The worm spreading processes under different
cases are compared and discussed.
Worm Spreads without Patching
Without loss of generality, we assume that, although no patch can be applied, some of the victim users still can manually
remove the worm by themselves. Assume the average cure rate for each infected node is dm. We also assume that, once an
individual is cured, it is immediately capable of being re-exploited by the same worm. Denote I(t) as the number of infectious
nodes at any time t, and i(t) = I(t)/N, the fraction of infectious nodes. The time evolution of i(t) can be captured by following
classic SIS model:
iii
dt
di
mdb --= )1( , (1)
The solution to differential equation (1) is:
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where r = dm /b, is the average ratio of the rate at which an infected node is cured to that at which it infects other nodes, and
i0 = i(t = 0) is the initial fraction of infected nodes.
Then we can easily derive the limiting values of i as follows:
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It says that, when the cure rate is higher than the infection rate, i decays exponentially from i0 to 0. However, if the cure rate
is lower than the infection rate, i goes from i0 and  eventually  saturates  to  (1  –r)  which  is  between 0  and 1.  The  intuition
behind this is straightforward. If the number of neighbors that an infectious node can exploit is less than one, the epidemic
will die out by itself. If this number is greater than one, the worm will spread out, but not necessarily infect all population at
the end. SIS model successfully captures the diffusion dynamics in case that there is no official treatment available as Internet
worms spread, though some victims may be able to remove the worms by themselves.
Worm Spreads with Patching
As software vendors increasingly realize the seriousness of Internet worms, it is often the case that patches addressing
particular worms will be released soon after it starts spreading. By applying the patches, users can either fix the damage
caused by the worms, or be immune from being infected by the same worms in future. The patches usually fall into three
categories, namely corrective patch, preventive patch, and comprehensive patch. A corrective patch is a removal tool
specifically targeting certain worms. It efficiently cleans up the worms from infected system but, usually, does not protect
users from being re-exploited. Differently, preventive patch usually cannot fix the infected systems but can provide immunity
for  those  who have  not  yet  infected  by  the  worms.  For  instants,  as  MSBlast  Worm spread in  2003,  Windows users  could
download and install the preventive patch from Microsoft web site to protect them from being infected (ZDNet 2003).
However  the  infected  users  could  not  get  rid  of  the  worm  by  applying  the  patch.  Comprehensive  patch  is  basically  a
combination of above two kinds of patches. By applying a single comprehensive patch, infected users can get their systems
fixed, while susceptible users can get immunized.
Corrective Patch
Since the system cured by applying corrective patches will be susceptible for re-infection immediately, the spreading model
here is essentially the same as the SIS model shown previously, except the average cure rate is replaced bydcr, the average
rate at which the corrective patch is applied. The subscript cr means corrective. We can safely assume that dcr > dm because
removing the worm with corrective patch should be much easier than doing it manually. We also assume that when corrective
patch is available, no infected user would choose to manually remove the worm by himself/herself. The system dynamics
then can be described by following differential equation:
crcrcrcr
cr iii
dt
di
db --= )1( . (4)
Similarly, we can solve above differential equation and get
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where rcr = dcr /b.
It is easy to see that, by applying corrective patch, the spreading process is essentially the same as no patch being applied,
except the limiting prevalence level is lower (given dcr > dm). Therefore, solely applying the corrective patch will not cease
the propagation and the epidemic will persist.
Preventive Patch
When preventive patches are available, the susceptible users can get themselves protected before being infected by the worm.
Therefore the susceptible population decreases as more and more patches are adopted. Denote the number (fraction) of the
susceptible nodes by Sp(t) (sp(t)). The subscript p means preventive. And assume the average rate at which susceptible users
adopt the preventive patch is dp. The systems dynamics can be described by following coupled differential equations:
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Note in this model, we assume that the preventive patch does not help infected users remove the worm. Therefore the cure
rate is dm here.
Above coupled differential equations do not have closed form solutions. However, by observing the dynamics of sp, we can
see that, due to the preventive patch, the susceptible population keeps decreasing along the spreading process. Eventually, the
whole population will become immune and the epidemic will stop.
Comprehensive Patch
It is often the case that the software vendor provides both corrective patch and preventive patch together, or packs them into
one single patch, namely comprehensive patch, which not only removes the worm from infected system, but also provides
immunity for susceptible users. In such scenario, the recovered users will not be susceptible again after applying the
comprehensive patch. A comprehensive patch is equivalent to a corrective patch for infected users, and a preventive patch for
susceptible users. The average rates at which the patch is adopted by the two kinds of users can be different. However,
considering  the  fact  that  the  patching process  is  increasing  automated,  here  we assume both  kinds  of  users  will  adopt  the
patch at the same rate, dc. The subscript c means comprehensive. Then the system dynamics can be captured as follows:
ï
î
ï
í
ì
+-=
-=
.)(
,
ccc
c
cccc
c
si
dt
ds
isi
dt
di
db
db
(6)
ic can be solved from above differential equations as follows,
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Since comprehensive patch combines the functionalities of both corrective patch and preventive patch, it is expected to
perform better in reducing the maximum spreading level as well as ceasing the epidemic. Figure 1 compares the spreading
process under different cases, where N = 100, b = 1.0, dm = 0.05, dcr = 0.2, dp = 0.1, dc = 0.1, and i0 = 0.01. The parameter
values that used in the numerical study are hypothetical but reasonable. Similar parameter configuration has also been used in
Kephart and White (1991), and Kim et al. (2004).
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No Patch
Figure 1. Comparison of virus spreading process under different conditions
Figure 1 shows that the worm spreads out and the epidemic converges to certain level if the patch does not provide immunity
and the cure rate is less than the infection rate. However, once immunity can be provided, the epidemic will be reduced
greatly and the peak of prevalence is limited by a much lower value. The spreading process diminishes after the peak. In
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addition, comprehensive patch shows strong superiority over other patching schemes in terms of maximum prevalence level
and the duration of the epidemic.
OPTIMAL PATCHING STRATEGIES
Due to the obvious advantage of comprehensively patching, we focus only on the case where comprehensive patch are
applied from now on. Specifically, we look for the optimal patch release time such that the total vendor cost is minimized for
given period [0, T]. Timely release of patches requires intense development effort, and hence incurs high development cost.
However, earlier patch release helps prevent the outbreak of the worms and reduces the damage among users, which may
affect the vendor’s long-term reputation and future revenues. The optimal strategy should balance these effects to minimize
the total cost.
Cost Structure
On the user side, the cost is directly linked with the degradation of the system performance caused by the worm. In previous
literatures, such cost is usually measured by a one-time cost per infection without considering the duration of infection
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004). However, in real world, the length of time during which the system is in imperfect condition should
be taken into account. Here we denote g as the cost incurred by infection during each time unit. Within a time unit, therefore,
the whole system incurs a cost of gi(t) at any time t. And the total user cost, Cu, is
ò=
T
u dttiC
0
)(g . (8)
On the vendor side, there are two categories of costs incurred. The cost for developing the comprehensive patch, and the
reputation cost indirectly transferred from the damage on the user side, i.e. the user cost.
Following Cavusoglu et al. (2004) and Arora et al. (2004), we model the patch development cost Cd = c –te, where c is the
development cost if the patch is released right after the worm starts spreading, and te represents  the  savings  in  patch
development cost associated with delaying the release to time t. As in Cavusoglu et al. (2004), we assume e is small enough
compared with c so that the total development cost will not be negative. This cost definition captures the basic relationship
between the intensity of patch development and the cost associated with it.
The reputation cost is closely related to the cost incurred on the user side. The more performance degradation caused by the
worm, the higher the reputation cost will be. Therefore we denote the reputation cost as aCu, where a > 0 (Cavusoglu et al.
2004).
Therefore, the total vendor cost, C, is
uCcC atet +-=)( . (9)
Assuming the patch is released at time t, the spreading process before and after t is captured by equation (1) and (6),
respectively. Denote the user cost in each period as C1 and C2, respectively. Then we have
òò +=+=
T
cu dttidttiCCC
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Note that the spreading process after the patch is released, ic, is a function of both t and t.
Since the epidemic will diminish as comprehensive patch is applied, the total user cost must be bounded. Therefore, without
introducing discount effect, we can extend T to infinity and still have the problem solvable. Rewrite the total vendor cost as
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Resolving (6) with initial conditions ic(t) = i(t), and ic(t) + sc(t) = 1, we have
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With (2) and (11) we can solve C1 and C2 as
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Optimal Release Time
Formally, we define the vendor cost minimization problem as
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By FOC, we have
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which is a linear function about i(t). Solving it, we get i*(t) as
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where r = dm / b. From (15) and (2), we can solve the optimal patch release time as
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Figure 2 shows the change of vendor’s costs as t increases, where N = 100,000, i0 = 0.00001, b = 5.0, dm = 0.5, dc = 3.0, a =
0.5, g = 10, c = 20, and e = 2.
0
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t
C
Total Cost
a C 2
a C 1
C d
Figure 2. Vendor’s Cost versus the patch release time
However, it is not always the case that the vendor will release the patch after the worm spreads for some time. Intuitively, if
the savings from delaying the release is large enough, the vendor will choose not to release the patch. On the other hand, if
the savings is far less than the reputation cost, the vendor may release the patch immediately after the worm starts spreading.
In order to find out the boundary conditions, we need to study the feasible range of k. From (3) we know that i(t) is bounded
by i0 and 1 –r (here only consider the case that r < 1). The same boundaries should hold for k, because k is the prevalence
level just before the patch is released. Therefore, k £ i0 is  the  condition  under  which  the  vendor  will  release  the  patch
immediately, while k ³ 1 –r is the condition under which the vendor will never release the patch.
From the perspective of the vendor, it would be more straightforward to see these conditions expressed by the relative
significance of the unit delay savings on development cost, e, to the reputation cost incurred by each infection, ag. Therefore,
we solve the threshold values of e/(ag) from above conditions, and formally present the optimal solutions as
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Since i0 £ 1 –r, Bl £ Bu always holds. Above solutions give a clear guideline for the vendor to make patching decisions. In
case that Bl = Bu, there is no optimal release time problem. The vendor will either release the patch instantly, or never release
any patch. It  is easy to prove that,  when e/(ag) < Bl, k must be greater then zero. When e/(ag) > Bu, however, k could be
either greater than 1 –r, or less than zero. Therefore the previous boundary conditions on k should be revised to
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Based on the same parameter configuration as in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows the impact of e/(ag) on the optimal patch release
time, where Bl and Bu are 0.00005 and 0.9, respectively.
0
1
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4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
e/(ag )
t *
Figure 3. Impact of e/(ag) on the optimal patch release time
Figure 4 shows the impact of dm, the rate at which victim users manually remove the worm, on the optimal patch release time.
As dm increases, the optimal time by which the patch should be released is convexly increasing. It says that when users can
remove the worm by themselves more efficiently, the vendor will be less pressured to release a patch promptly. Therefore it
can delay the patch release for a longer time to reduce the development cost. As dm exceeds certain threshold value, the
vendor virtually does not need to release any patch at all, because the users are efficient enough in dealing with the worm by
themselves. Figure 5 shows the impact of dc, the rate at which victim users remove the worm or get immunized by applying
the comprehensive patch, on the optimal patch release time. t* is concavely increasing in dc, which means that, as the patch
works more efficiently, the vendor is less likely to release the patch in a rush. However, no matter how large dc is, the vendor
always needs to release the patch, given that dm is lower than the threshold value. If dc is below certain threshold value, the
vendor will release the patch immediately. The underlying logic is that, since the patch is so inefficient in ceasing the
epidemic, the vendor has to release it as soon as possible to avoid the worm spreading out. An interesting observation from
these numerical results is that, the decision of whether or not immediately release the patch depends on dc, while the decision
of whether or not release any patch at all depends on dm.
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Figure 4. Impact of dm on
the optimal patch release time
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Figure 5. Impact of dc on
the optimal patch release time
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we study the spreading process of Internet worms and the impact of various patching schemes on it. Starting
with the classic SIS model, we analyze the simplest case where no patch is available and infected users have to remove the
worm manually. If the rate at which the worm is removed is less than the infection rate, the epidemic will persist and the
limiting value of the prevalence level is 1 –r, where r is the ratio of the average rate at which the worm is removed to the
average infection rate. In case that there is corrective patch available, users can fix infected systems easier with the patch.
Therefore the average cure rate is very likely to be higher and the limiting value of prevalence level will be lower than the
case where no patch is available. However, since no immunity is provided, solely applying corrective patch does not cease
the epidemic unless the cure rate exceeds the infection rate. When preventive patch, the patch that immunizes susceptible
users, emerges, the number of vulnerable systems keeps decreasing as more and more users adopt the patch. The epidemic
will finally die out even though preventive patch does not cure infected systems directly. Finally, as a combination of
corrective patch and preventive patch, we introduce the notion of comprehensive patch, which cures and immunizes adopters
at the same time. Numerical result shows that, by applying comprehensive patch, both maximum prevalence level and the
duration of the epidemic can be reduced significantly.
Based on the spreading models developed, we further explore the optimal patch release problem in terms of vendor’s total
cost over infinite horizon. Due to the strong superiority of comprehensive patch, we limit our research to this patching
scheme only. The optimal time by which the patch is released balances the patch development cost, which is assumed to be a
linear decreasing function over time, and the reputation cost incurred by the users’ damage caused by the worms. Different
from previous IT security research, the user cost in this paper is modeled as a function of not only the number of infected
users, but also the length of time during which the system is in imperfect condition. We find closed form solutions for the
vendor cost minimization problem. The results suggest that the patch release time is convexly increasing in the rate at which
the users manually remove the worms, and concavely increasing in the rate at which the comprehensive patch is adopted. We
also derive the boundary conditions, under which the vendor will release the patch immediately after the prevalence starts, or
never release the patch at all.
In addition to the findings in this research, there are plenty of room to improve and many interesting directions to go. For
example, the development cost is simplified to a linear decreasing function of the duration of the development. Although it
applies well when the duration is within certain range, it fails when t is large enough so that the development cost becomes
negative, which is clearly not true in reality. A more proper way to model the development cost should capture the feature of
decreasing marginal benefit. Another refinement can be made is about the parameter values in the spreading models. At this
time point, we assume that these values are predetermined and ready for use as the vendor makes patching decisions. In real
world, however, it is not likely for the vendor to know about the parameters right after the worm starts spreading. Instead, it
can only estimate them, and the accuracy of the estimation is closely related to the time the vendor spends in observing the
propagation of the worm. In this case, delaying the patch release will not only reduce the development cost, but also help the
vendor to get a clear picture of the spreading process. In this paper, we optimize the patch release time based on the total
vendor cost. The user cost is considered as an indirect cost to the vendor and discounted by a. It could be interesting if we
look at the problem from the viewpoint of social welfare. Certain incentive mechanisms might be needed to align the social
optima and the vendor optima.
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